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Abstract: 
Ubiquitous networking facilitates Internet access across multiple network environments, whose value is tied directly to
user perceptions of its ability to securely execute transactions. Prior research has cited awareness, trust, and risk as
critical determinants of adoption but has failed to examine these factors as they relate to infrastructure and its
provider. Because information in transit is at risk from a network environment’s vulnerabilities, we focus on the
implications of such risk on Internet activities. We examine the multiple parties that must be trusted to complete and
facilitate an online transaction. We propose that the user must trust not only the information recipient to act
benevolently but also the technologies and organizations that facilitate the online exchange. 
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1 Introduction 
Stephen is sipping his latte in front of his computer at his favorite coffee shop. He frequents this coffee 
shop because they provide great lattes and free Wi-Fi. Tomorrow is Valentine’s Day, and he decides to 
order his wife flowers from a popular Web retailer. He has used this retailer before and he trusts that they 
will deliver his flowers on time and protect his personal information. With little effort, he navigates to the 
retailer’s website, selects a beautiful arrangement, enters in shipping and payment information, completes 
the purchase, and thinks he has secured a nominee for husband of the year. Unfortunately for Stephen, 
Erica knew that online flower sales traditionally elevate the day before Valentine’s Day, so she spoofed 
the coffee shop’s wireless network and waited for someone to browse to that particular flower vendor. 
Despite Stephen’s best efforts to use a trusted Web retailer that used secure protocols, Erica was able to 
capture Stephen’s sensitive information. Once Stephen gets back to work, things will get much worse. 
Erica also surreptitiously installed a virus that spreads throughout networked machines on the same 
domain.  
This story illustrates how one network environment’s vulnerabilities can compromise the security of 
another network environment. A network environment encompasses the organizations providing Internet 
connectivity, the physical location and surroundings, network architecture, and hardware infrastructure, 
and each contribute to the environment’s security profile. Network environments include workplaces, 
schools, homes, public locations (coffee shops, restaurants, public libraries, etc.), and anywhere with 
cellular access, and each has unique security characteristics that vary the amount of risk to transmitted 
information (Hansman & Hunt 2005; Straub & Welke 1998). Information in transit over any of these 
networks is vulnerable to compromise at the point of origination through the network infrastructure to the 
intended or unintended recipient.  
Lee et al. (2013) have developed a simplified diagram of the parties involved with online communications 
(see Figure 1). It portrays the data-handling nodes that are potential targets of hacker attacks. The “active 
parties” are human agents that can use the information: the sender, receiver, hackers, or a secondary 
recipient. Information is transmitted through “passive parties” (the sender’s local area network (LAN), 
internet service provider, telecom service provider, recipient’s LAN). Passive parties manage the 
infrastructure required to transmit data. Both “active” and “passive” parties use information technology (IT) 
artifacts to achieve their individual goals. IT artifacts are “bundles of material and cultural properties 
packaged in some socially recognizable form such as hardware and/or software” (Orlikowski & Iacono, 
2001, p. 121). Information “senders,” “recipients,” and “secondary recipients” use end devices (e.g., 
laptops, mobile phones, tablets, etc.) and LANs. “LAN providers” manage the hardware and software 
(e.g., Wi-Fi access points, switches, routers, etc.) required to provide LAN services. The “internet service 
providers” and “telecom service providers” operate the infrastructure, backbone, and routing systems that 
interconnect the LANs. (Tarasewich & Warkentin, 2000; Tarasewich, Nickerson, & Warkentin, 2002) 
“Hackers” exploit IT artifact vulnerabilities with IT artifacts that provide attack vectors (e.g., promiscuous 
network interface controllers, malware, penetration testing software, etc.) to intercept the information at 
any of these points (Hansman & Hunt 2005). While each of these parties play an important role in 
enabling an online transaction, general users may not be cognizant of the internet service providers or the 
telecom service providers. Therefore, this research focuses on how users view the LAN environment to 
form intentions and execute online transactions. 
 
Figure 1. Information Flow and Attack Targets
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1.1 LAN Attack Vectors 
Lee et al.’s (2013) model describes where information is susceptible to an attack, but it does not describe 
how the information is susceptible. The goal of computer security is to maintain confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992) by mitigating vulnerabilities through security 
controls (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2009). The LAN is the user’s portal to the 
Internet. The LAN is where the user controls what information is sent. Keeping information secure can be 
as simple as not sending sensitive information over untrusted networks. Untrusted networks contain 
vulnerabilities that provide hackers with targets to compromise victims’ information. The purpose of attack 
vectors range from gathering information to denying services (Hansman & Hunt 2005). A typical attack 
starts with sniffing, or scanning, to capture information. One then uses the captured data to launch higher-
order attacks such as impersonation attacks, replay attacks, modification attacks, channel accessible by 
non-endpoint (also known as man-in-the-middle attacks), malware injection, and denial-of-service attacks 
(Hansman & Hunt 2005; Higgins 2007; The Open Web Application Security Project, 2009). We address 
these attack vectors in the following paragraphs. 
One of the key vulnerability points in an online transaction is the local infrastructure (Byrd, 2011). A 
sniffing or snooping attack compromises the sender’s information’s confidentiality by capturing information 
transmitted over the network infrastructure. One performs it by either capturing packets over the airwaves 
on a legitimate Wi-Fi network or by establishing a rogue network that spoofs the legitimate network. This 
attack typically targets initial connection information (i.e., usernames, passwords, secret keys, etc.), which 
provides the attacker with credentials that to the attacker can use launch second-tier attacks (Stewart, 
Tittel, & Chapple, 2008). Sidejacking is a common scanning attack that gathers a victim’s cookies and 
uniform resource locator (URL) trail, which allows the attacker to hijack the victim’s session and gain 
access to online accounts (Garcia 2010; Higgins 2007). The initial connection authentication information 
enables the attacker to target the victim, target the victim’s intended destination, or establish a channel 
accessible by non-endpoint attack to further exploit the victim.  
Targeting the victim based on authentication credentials enables the attacker to gain access to the 
victim’s computer. Once access is established, the attacker can perform several higher-order attacks 
ranging from denial of service to malware injection. Typically, denial-of-service attacks only result in a 
compromise of availability, but an attacker can use them to distract the victim from the attacker’s 
executing a confidentiality or integrity attack. Because denial-of-service attacks indirectly target a user’s 
information, we focus on confidentiality and integrity attacks. Malware injection is dangerous because the 
user may have decided to engage in a low-sensitivity transaction based on low perceived risk to the 
information, yet could suffer a compromised system from which an attacker can surreptitiously exfiltrate 
sensitive information at a later date. 
Focusing at the other end of the transmission, the attacker could leverage the victim’s intended 
information recipient by using impersonation or masquerading attacks, replay attacks, and modification 
attacks. Impersonation attacks use the captured information to mimic the victim. Similarly, a replay attack 
mimics the victim by replaying the captured packets against the victim’s intended destination system. If 
the system uses improved authentication mechanisms and session sequencing, the attacker would 
execute a modification attack by modifying the information in the packets prior to replay (Stewart et al., 
2008). Alternately, if the user and the endpoint use additional advanced authentication encryption 
techniques, the attacker could use a man-in-the-middle attack the way the hacker did in the introductory 
scenario. This attack permits malicious individuals (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) to intercept a 
communication between two parties by splitting the original connection, spoofing the encryption 
certificates, and acting as a proxy to the victim. Victims believe they are securely communicating with the 
intended endpoint but they are communicating through the attacker (The Open Web Application Security 
Project, 2009). Figure 2 illustrates the attack, which compromises the victim’s confidentiality and integrity 
and allows the attacker to view and modify the victim’s transmission (MITRE, 2011). A successful man-in-
the-middle attack enables the attacker to perform additional attacks such as address resolution protocol 
spoofing, directory name service spoofing, and hyperlink spoofing to redirect the victim to the attacker’s 
desired destinations (The Open Web Application Security Project, 2009). 
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Figure 2. Man-in-the-middle Attack
The typical mitigation strategy for man-in-the-middle attacks is endpoint authentication using digital 
certificates and secure socket layer connections. One can thwart this countermeasure by mimicking the 
intended endpoint using falsified credentials and establishing two secure socket layer connections: one 
with the victim using an invalid certificate and one with the victim’s intended endpoint using a valid 
certificate (see Figure 2). Victims may only receive a certificate error that they will likely dismiss and, 
consequently, engage in transacting with the man-in-the middle attacker (Garcia, 2010; The Open Web 
Application Security Project, 2009). This type of man-in-the-middle attack enables the attacker to capture 
all of the victim’s traffic that one thought endpoint encryption secured. 
Service providers have deployed countermeasures to combat specific vulnerabilities; however, the 
purpose and concepts of the attacks presented remain the same. For example, regardless of any 
encryption mechanism, sniffing still seeks to capture information about the information transmitted, which 
is then decrypted using various techniques. One can even break the Advanced Encryption Standard 256 
with the right algorithm and computational power (Bogdanov, Khovratovich, & Rechberger, 2011). 
Hackers have access to incredible computational power at inexpensive prices through cloud computing. 
Individuals have used the cloud was used to crack Wi-Fi’s protected access pre-shared key for less than 
USD$2.10 (Rashid, 2011) and the Sony PlayStation network for less than USD$1.68 (Goodin, 2011). 
New stories of successful attacks and personal experiences shape users’ perceptions of network 
environments. There is a history of organizations failing to deploy the appropriate countermeasures. A 
prime example of an organization that has implemented inadequate security measures is the TJX 
Companies’ breach in 2006 in which “(a)n intruder exploited these failures and obtained tens of millions of 
credit and debit payment cards that consumers used at TJX’s stores, as well as the personal information 
of approximately 455,000 consumers who returned merchandise to the stores” (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2008, p. 1). TJX’s failure to use appropriate wireless security countermeasures highlights an 
example of an attack on a network environment that could have been prevented if the appropriate 
countermeasures were deployed. While organizations have recognized this deficiency, unsecured Wi-Fi is 
prevalent in many public locations and hackers are savvy to these vulnerabilities. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and other government agencies have reported malware injection incidents through pop-ups 
displayed when individuals establish a Wi-Fi session at hotels (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2012). 
The weak security postures of public Wi-Fi hotspots make these attacks possible. The network 
environment includes the infrastructure architecture, which contributes to the network’s security. Hackers 
exfiltrated target customer data in 2013 in an attack that Target could have prevented with a properly 
segmented network (Krebs, 2014). While the public may not understand the intricacies of the attack or the 
proper mitigation techniques, the event influenced users’ perceptions of network security and the safety of 
their sensitive information.  
1.2 Research Purpose 
Not all network environments are susceptible to the same attack vectors, which makes some 
environments more trustworthy than others. Users can reduce the probability of a compromise by only 
engaging in sensitive online activities in trusted network environments. How that trust if formed and how 
risk is evaluated are important facets of information systems research because they drive online behavior. 
To understand these concepts, we seek to address the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: How does trust in the parties involved in an online transaction influence users’ intent to 
provide sensitive information online?  
RQ2: What role does general information security awareness have in determining perceived risk?  
To investigate these research questions, we use a decision process model and theories from extant 
literature to describe each decision phase. We address pre-activity attributes, describe the users’ decision 
process to form perception of an activity, describe how these perceptions form intentions that are followed 
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by actions, and describe the outcomes of those actions. Specifically, we propose that users establish their 
general information security awareness (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010) in the pre-activity phase 
and use it to determine perceived risk and network trust when placed in a situation that requires the 
transmission of sensitive information. We also propose that network trust forms perceptions of risk to the 
information with a downstream influence on intent (Ajzen, 1991), action (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 
1989), and, finally, outcomes that ultimately influence pre-activity attributes. 
Previous research has investigated users’ behavioral intention to transact in e-commerce by including the 
network infrastructure as a transparent actor in the transaction and have focused on the perceived risk 
stemming from the information recipient—the Web service provider, Web retailer, or e-government agency 
(Dinev & Hart 2006; Featherman & Pavlou 2003; Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000; Pavlou, 2003; 
Warkentin, Gefen, Pavlou, & Rose, 2002). 
This focus on the ultimate information recipient nominalizes the intermediary network IT artifact because 
the enabling technology is absent. We approach the IT artifact from an ensemble view as an embedded 
system that is enmeshed with the conditions of use (Orlikowski & Iacono 2001), which provides intrinsic 
risks to an Internet activity. Shifting the focus from the Web service provider to the network environment 
helps widen the understanding of Internet behaviors by examining users’ perceived risk and network trust 
to protect information from malicious outsiders. Figure 3 illustrates this differentiated focus. The sender of 
information (e.g., consumer) must trust the LAN provider (e.g., coffee shop), the infrastructure (e.g., Wi-Fi 
network), and the information receiver (e.g., a Web retailer) to protect their information from hackers and 
secondary recipients (e.g., third-party marketers). The dashed line indicates prior research’s focus on the 
intended information recipient (Web service provider or retailer), while the solid line depicts our focus on 
the network environment. 
 
Figure 3. Trusted Parties and Threats in an Internet Transaction 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we highlight foundational research in the extant literature. In 
Section 3, we logically thread existing theories through the decision process model while building a 
theoretical framework to base our propositions. In Section 4, we present potential findings, implications, 
limitations, and future research opportunities. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper. 
2 Literature Review 
The dominant research paradigm for researching the nomological net of Internet behavior explores users’ 
intention to transact with the endpoint of a communication channel—specifically a Web retailer or e-
service provider. These studies focus on the endpoint’s characteristics and exclude the characteristics of 
the network provider or the network infrastructure (e.g., Antón & Earp 2004; Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; 
Dinev & Hu, 2007; Featherman & Pavlou 2003; Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999; Malhotra, Kim, & 
Agarwal, 2004; Pavlou, 2003). Cho (2004) evaluates variables that determine aborting transactions with 
Internet retailers and specifically looks at the cognitive evaluation of the endpoint’s attributes with 
consumers’ attitudes and past behaviors. Dinev and Hart’s (2006) extended privacy calculus model 
compares consumers’ personal internet interest, internet privacy concerns, and perceived internet privacy 
risk with Internet trust to determine individuals’ willingness to provide personal information to transact on 
the Internet. The instrument items the authors use to measure trust directly address the competence, 
reliability, and safety of Internet websites and omit the network environment. Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) 
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examine trust in store, attitude, and risk perception as antecedents for the willingness to buy from an 
Internet store. The scales they use to measure the Internet store’s perceived characteristics include 
reputation, perceived size, store trustworthiness, and attitudes towards the store, and the scales capture 
general Web-shopping risk attitudes by generically querying on Internet risk.  
The potential offenders in the prior research mentioned included the intended endpoint (e.g., Web retailer) 
and nominalized the physical environment where the transaction occurred. The result is that trust and risk 
evaluations are solely dependent on the intended recipient without regarding the network environment. 
We argue that incorporating the network environment it into evaluations is appropriate because the 
infrastructure is collection of technologies that enable online activities to occur. Without the network 
infrastructure in the trust evaluation, a user’s intent to transact with a Web retailer is implicitly derived from 
the user’s beliefs in the technological infrastructure characteristics (Pavlou, 2003). We agree that the onus 
for trust lies with the intended recipient and that Web retailers can affect environmental trust by 
implementing certain countermeasures (Benassi, 1999; Bhimani, 1996). However, these countermeasures 
can be ineffective in combating the infrastructure’s vulnerabilities that we identify in Section 1. Network 
environment vulnerabilities make the LAN an important IT artifact during the transaction decision process 
because it provides hackers with attack opportunities. 
The crime-specific opportunity structure adapted from Clarke (1995) by Willison and Backhouse (2006) 
identifies the physical environment as a required element for exploiting victims because it provides 
criminals with targets. The model also suggests that individual’s lifestyle and routine activities provide 
parties external to the transmission with opportunities to compromise data. Willison and Backhouse (2006) 
state that a vacant house without guardianship is a viable and attractive target to those that would wish to 
steal from or damage it. A public Wi-Fi access point without encryption cannot protect data in transit and 
are in many ways like a vacant house without guardianship. That is, they are a soft target for hackers. 
Behavioral patterns also can contribute to supplying victims (Willison & Backhouse, 2006), such as men 
waiting the day before Valentine’s Day to buy flowers. Social engineering provides hackers with 
intelligence on targets to identify user behaviors that they can exploit, such as frequently using a coffee 
shop’s Wi-Fi or a particular Web retailer.  
The network environment provides individuals with targets that they attack using techniques that exploit 
vulnerabilities (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). One must address infrastructure vulnerabilities by altering the 
characteristics of the network environment. Exploitable network characteristics create an environment with 
the potential for one to opportunistically steal users’ information, and, thus, result in loss. The possibility of 
such a loss is risk, and information risk is when information is the asset that can be lost (Loch et al., 
1992). Previous research has viewed the opportunistic behavior stemming from the risks associated with 
engaging with a Web retailer; however, the research nominalizes the risk introduced by the network 
environment by aggregating it into the transaction.  
Prior research has identified trust as one’s willingness to be vulnerable and accept risk (Gefen, Benbasat, 
& Pavlou, 2008; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The management literature has addressed the trust-
risk relationship (Bauer, 1967; Cunningham, 1967; Gefen et al., 2008; Jacoby & Kaplan, 1972; Mayer et 
al., 1995) and the information systems research adopted it to e-commerce transactions with little regard to 
the network environment (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Hoffman et al., 1999; Pavlou, 
2003). We extend the prior research by focusing on the potential offender external to the transaction that 
exploits the vulnerabilities of the technological infrastructure instead of the internal transaction 
characteristics of the Web retailer. The literature has provided a solid foundation for exploring user 
behavior in multiple network environments for a transaction requiring sensitive information that is 
applicable to trust of the network environment. We start by creating a decision-process model to map 
relevant theories to each decision phase and discuss how each construct may influence users’ decision to 
transmit sensitive information while operating in multiple network environments. 
3 Theoretical Framework 
Previous studies have focused on decisions based on the intended information recipient’s characteristics. 
Our research focuses on decisions based on the network environment’s characteristics, and one can view 
our research as a parallel process to other online behavior models. Lee et al. (2013) have created a 
dichotomous framework depicted in Figure 4 that combines Jarvenpaa et al.’s (2000) consumer/retailer 
trust model with a consumer/network trust model. This study adds detail on the trust and risk evaluation 
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from a service provider and infrastructure perspective to the consumer/network trust portion model and 
provides broader view of perceived risk during Internet transactions. 
 
Figure 4. Lee et al.’s (2013) Dichotomous Consumer Transaction Model 
The threat to the consumer exists from opportunistic behavior executed by the intended recipient and 
individuals exploiting network environment vulnerabilities. Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) suggest that perceived 
size and perceived reputation of an Internet retailer can evoke trust. Perception of size is a consumer’s 
subjective evaluation of the retailer’s actual size and not measured by the store’s sales volume or 
products for sale. Perceived reputation is the degree to which a consumer believes the retailer is honest 
and benevolence toward its customers. Both perceived size and perceived reputations are judgments of a 
store’s attributes that individuals use to determine trust in store. Similarly, one must evaluate the network 
environment characteristics prior to engaging in online activities to determine if the network is capable of 
protecting information from harm. This evaluation determines network trust.  
Determining network trust requires cognizance of how the network environment characteristics affect the 
environment’s ability to protect information. This knowledge also provides an understanding of the impact 
of an information breach. General information security awareness is fundamental for effective information 
security (Furnell, 2008; Goodhue & Straub, 1991) and provides users with the understanding proper 
information-handling practices (Siponen, 2000; Straub & Welke, 1998). The integrated model includes 
general information security awareness as a construct that informs users of the environmental dangers 
and influences their information privacy concerns. 
Trust is a governance mechanism that enables an exchange. Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) focuses on trust in 
store, which is parallel to network trust in Figure 4. Trust in store is the trustworthiness of the Internet 
store, whereas network trust is the trustworthiness of the network environment the buyer is using to 
connect to the Internet. Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) focused on the impact the trust in store has on perceived 
risk, which is appropriate from an e-commerce perspective. Lee et al.’s (2013) model includes information 
types to generalize the model to all personal Internet activities beyond e-commerce.  
The dichotomous model also has two types of risk. The network environment and intended endpoint are 
sources of risk during an online transaction (Pavlou, 2003), and both sources are present in the integrated 
model in Figure 4. Jarvenpaa et al.’s (2000) perceived risk is directed towards the buyer’s being 
mistreated by stores. This risk focuses on losses a buyer may experience from the seller’s action. 
However, in an online transaction, the seller is not the only source of risk. The network environment can 
lead to information compromise, which puts the information at risk. Figure 4 parallels the risk from the 
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Internet store with perceived information risk. This risk is the potential of loss of data (e.g., credit card 
information) during the transaction that is attributed to the network vulnerabilities.  
The different facets of risk inhibit one’s ability to engage in e-commerce (Featherman & Pavlou, 2003). 
Risks associated with the retailer impact purchasers’ willingness to buy (Jarvenpaa et al., 2000). Risks 
associated with the network environment will impact purchasers’ intent to provide sensitive information 
online. The key difference in these constructs is that one accepts the potential loss from the retailer and 
the other accepts the potential loss from the network environment. Consumers must accept both types of 
risk prior to engaging in online transactions.  
3.1 Decision Process Model 
Separating out the network environment factors from the integrated model presented in Figure 4 focuses 
the discussion on decisions about the network environment. We identify five phases in a decision-process 
model and map each construct to each phase in Figure 5. We use the consumer purchase decision 
process (Turban, King, Lee, Warkentin, & Chung, 2002, p. 88) as the basis for our generalized decision 
process model. Prior to any activity, individuals will have attributes that they will use to make a decision. 
For example, in the consumer purchase decision process, purchasers have a need or want. Once an 
individual is placed in a situation, they assess the benefits of action versus costs and the result of that 
assessment then informs a decision, which the individual then transfers into an action. That action then 
creates outcomes that change the individual’s pre-activity state for future decisions. In the context of our 
research, we are interested an individual’s general information security awareness during the pre-activity 
phase and the individual’s evaluation of network trust and perceived risk, which results in the individual’s 
intent to provide sensitive information online. This intent then leads to an internet transaction, which 
ultimately influences the individual’s general information security Awareness for any future decisions. 
Figure 5. Research Model Mapped to a Decision Process
3.2 Pre-activity 
Many different personal attributes such as traits, attitudes, and beliefs form the basis for decision making 
that exist prior one’s being in a decision making situation (Sherman & Fazio, 1983). The theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991) addresses attitudes, feelings towards subjective norms, and behavioral control for 
specific behaviors of interest, but one can generalize the theory to apply more broadly to describe a 
person’s pre-activity cognitive state. Among these broader concepts that relate to the present study are 
propensity to trust (Mayer et al., 1995), disposition to trust (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002), 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), risk propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), and risk tolerance (Barsky, 
Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro, 1997). While these are important constructs in evaluating the trust/risk 
relationship, they do not provide insights on information security-related attributes. We proffer that general 
information security awareness is a key information security construct that drives the evaluation of 
network trust and perceived risk  
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3.2.1 General Information Security Awareness 
Cognitive appraisals of threat sources require an understanding of potential threats. Protection motivation 
theory presupposes that the threatened individual is aware of the threat and is able to comprehend the 
noxious event (Rogers, 1975). Lack of awareness of the threat may lead to ignoring the threat and 
increase one’s vulnerability (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). The innovation diffusion theory identifies 
awareness as the first step by identifying three types of knowledge: awareness knowledge, how-to 
knowledge, and principles knowledge. Awareness knowledge is simply the understanding that the 
technology exists. Once a technology is recognized, one establishes how-to knowledge by understanding 
how to properly apply the technology (Rogers, 1995). Awareness knowledge in the context of protective 
technology adoption refers to an understanding of the threats and consequences of not using protective 
technologies, and how-to knowledge refers to the availability and effectiveness of using protective 
technologies to safeguard the user against unwanted consequences (Dinev & Hu, 2007). Conceptually, 
we adopt this view of awareness for protective technologies as an awareness of the information security’s 
characteristics. If one is aware of the protective technologies (i.e., countermeasures, safeguards, controls, 
etc.), then one is aware of the threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts of consequences of using the 
environment. Simply put, knowing the cure presupposes knowing the disease.  
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) posit that information-security awareness is an antecedent to attitude, which drives 
one’s intention to comply with information-security policies. Understanding general information security 
provides users with knowledge of the dangers of operating in different network environments. Without this 
awareness, users are blind to the environmental vulnerabilities that we discuss in Section 1, which can 
lead to their falsely assessing environmental threats and networks’ trustworthiness. Misplaced trust may 
cause the user to place sensitive data at risk by transmitting in an unsecure environment and, thus, 
causing a loss of sensitive information. General information security awareness is a baseline 
understanding of the ways information can be stolen and misused and provides insights into the sensitivity 
level of information transmitted on the Internet.  
We use Bulgurcu et al. (2010) construct as an antecedent to perceived risk and one’s information 
sensitivity level in an Internet transaction. Substituting intention to comply with intention to transact nets a 
generalized version of the awareness construct that we can use for our purposes. Bulgurcu et al. posit 
that information security awareness comprises general information security awareness and information 
security policy awareness. While both of these constructs are important requirements for organizational 
compliance, generalizing awareness to personal Internet activities removes organizational policies from 
the Internet activity. Consistent with Bulgurcu et al. (2010), we define general information security 
awareness as one’s fundamental understanding of potential security issues and impacts developed 
through experiences and education. 
3.3 Evaluation 
Decisions are made once an individual is in a situation that requires action. Our situation of interest is 
when a user has the ability to engage in personal Internet activities from different network environments 
that require sensitive information. Engaging personal Internet activities ultimately depends on the 
situational factors that are, themselves, variant depending on characteristics of the network environment 
and the information necessary to complete a particular transaction. While other factors, such as 
communication urgency, convenience, cost, or facilitating conditions (Venkatesh, Morris, Hall, Davis, & 
Davis, 2003), could influence personal Internet behaviors, these factors indirectly relate to our focus of 
perceived risk and network trust. We suggest that the evaluation phase of the decision process model 
includes determining network trust and perceived risk.  
3.3.1 Network Trust 
The network environment includes the LAN provider, physical location and surroundings, network 
architecture, hardware infrastructure, and software configuration. The physical location may be a coffee 
shop, workplace, school, anywhere with a cellular data connection, or home. The physical surroundings 
can affect the security posture of the network from the number of people present to the seating 
configuration, both of which contribute to the possibility of shoulder surfing. Closely related to the physical 
location is the organization responsible for LAN access. The organization may be a retailer, restaurant, 
employer, university, mobile phone service provider, or an individual operating a home network. The LAN 
provider will determine the wired or wireless network architecture, the hardware infrastructure, and 
180 A Broader View of Perceived Risk during Internet Transactions
 
Volume 38   Paper 8  
 
software that deliver connectivity. Network environments vary in the architecture, technology, and 
processes employed. These variations result in unique security capabilities and vulnerabilities.  
Mayer et al. (1995) and Schoorman and Mayer’s (2007) follow-up editorial identify trust as one’s 
willingness to be vulnerable and one’s willingness to take risks based on perceived trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness is a trusting belief that evaluates a trustee’s characteristics (Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 
2003) by assessing the trustee’s ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995). The ability 
evaluation determines if the trustee’s aptitude in the activity’s domain is sufficient to protect the trustor 
from negative outcomes. Benevolence is a judgment of goodwill from the trustee towards the trustor. 
Integrity measures if the trustor’s principles align with the trustee and are followed during the activity 
(Mayer et al., 1995). IS researchers have used these definitions of trust to examine mobile commerce 
(Siau & Shen, 2003), e-service adoption (Featherman & Pavlou, 2003; Lee & Turban, 2001), Internet and 
mobile payment services (Lu, Yang, Chau, & Cao, 2011; Lee, Warkentin, & Choi, 2004), online shopping 
(Gefen et al., 2003; McKnight et al., 2002), e-government (Grimsley & Meehan, 2007; Warkentin, Gefen, 
Pavlou, & Rose, 2002), and virtual teams (Paul & McDaniel, 2004). Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) suggest that 
perceived size and reputation can garner trust. Others have shown that trust can be obtained from 
recommendation agents (Wang & Benbasat, 2005), trust-assuring claims (Kim & Benbasat, 2006), or 
directly from characteristics of an IT artifact (Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque, & Straub, 2008).  
While trust has been an important research construct in examining Internet activities, the primary focus 
has been on the information sender’s trust in the information recipient, such as an online retailer, 
government agency, or other e-service provider (McKnight et al., 2002) rather than trust in the IT artifact 
(Vance et al., 2008). Though some scholars have directly referenced the existence of the IT artifact in an 
evaluation of trust, its impact has been predominantly marginalized. Pavlou (2003) identifies perceived 
risk and trust as key drivers to intention to transact with Web retailers and encapsulates one’s willingness 
to be vulnerable to a Web retailer to include both the Web retailer’s and the technological infrastructure’s 
characteristics. Similarly, Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) look at the trust in store and nominalize the IT artifact 
while researching Internet shopper behaviors. Part of the issue may stem from the factors of 
trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, and integrity). Of the three factors, only ability is germane to an IT 
artifact because the IT artifact lacks moral agency and cannot exhibit benevolence or integrity. IT’s ability 
to perform depends on the protocols and implementation practices used to establish the network 
environment characteristics. Users judge the ability of the characteristics to protect information against 
compromise and determine if the IT artifact is trustworthy. 
Removing the IT artifact from the trustworthiness evaluation limits the understanding of the artifact’s 
impact on user behavior because it aggregates all of the trust relationships required to conduct Internet 
activities into a single evaluation. One evaluates many trust relationships during an Internet transaction. 
The integrated theoretical model presented in Figure 4 divorces the Web service provider/retailer trust 
evaluation from the infrastructure trust evaluation and differentiates these two trust sources by trust in 
store and network trust. Users evaluate the characteristics perceived size and perceived reputation of the 
online store to determine trust in store (Jarvenpaa et al., 2000). Simultaneously, users evaluate the 
network environment characteristics to determine the network environment’s ability to protect sensitive 
information. Determining if a network environment has the ability requires an understanding of information 
security. Therefore, we propose: 
P1:  General information security awareness is negatively associated with network trust. 
3.3.2 Perceived Risk 
Risk is present when a threat that causes negative consequences may possibly exist that can 
compromise a user’s information (Loch et al., 1992). Perceived risk is one’s evaluation of the outcomes 
that have the potential for loss during an event (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) regardless 
of the actual threat and subsequently actual risk. Perceived risk is an inhibitor to one’s engaging in e-
commerce activities because of product-specific risk (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Featherman & Pavlou, 
2003), seller-specific risk (Featherman & Pavlou, 2003; Jarvenpaa et al., 2000), and network environment-
specific risk. Perceived risk in an online transaction manifests through the loss of sensitive information 
because of environmental vulnerabilities. It is the residual uncertainty that the information could be 
compromised after one evaluates the trustworthiness of the parties in the transaction. Evaluating risk 
requires the decision maker to label the situation as positive or negative based on the individual’s 
determination of the probability of loss (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). To make this evaluation, information at risk 
and an awareness of how the environment’s characteristics can lead to a loss must exist. The type of 
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information and the risk to that information based on environmental threats is the residual risk, which are 
from threats outside the relationship with the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). Therefore, we propose:  
P2: Network trust is negatively associated with perceived risk. 
P3:  General information security awareness is positively associated with perceived risk. 
3.3.3 LAN Provider Trust 
IT artifacts cannot exist without someone maintaining and operating them. LAN providers are the entities 
that maintain and operate the users’ gateway to the Internet. Often, providing Internet connectivity is not a 
core competency of an organization but is either a necessary business enabler or a value-added service. 
We use a coffee shop in the introductory scenario: its primary business is supplying coffee to its 
customers, and free Wi-Fi is a value-added service that attracts customers. Organizations’ reputations will 
impact how users perceive the services the organizations provide, and their reputations can extend to 
non-core competency areas. TJX’s core competency is retail services, and consumers trusted TJX to 
protect their information. However, TJX’s breach in 2006 highlights that the network infrastructure that TJX 
used did not have sufficient security controls, which resulted in damage to the company’s reputation 
(Culnan & Williams, 2009). Therefore, we propose: 
P4:  LAN provider trust moderates the relationship between network trust and perceived risk. 
3.4 Decision 
A decision of whether or not to engage in an online transaction depends on one’s assessing network trust 
and the perceived risk associated with the transaction. The decision to act is behavioral intention, which 
itself indicates the level in which one is willing to perform a specified behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Risk reduces 
intentions because of the possibility of undesirable consequences (Featherman & Pavlou, 2003). The 
intention to provide sensitive information, through actions such as e-commerce, often depends on one’s 
evaluating the intended recipient and the network environment (Pavlou, 2003). We propose decoupling 
this evaluation by controlling the variables for the intended recipient and manipulating the network 
environments. By doing so, we proffer that the outcome of the trust/risk evaluation of the network 
environment drives behavioral intention. Therefore, we propose: 
P5:  Perceived risk is negatively associated with intent to provide sensitive information online. 
3.5 Action 
Intentions must be formed prior to cognitively engaging in actions (Petter, DeLone, & McLean, 2008). 
These intentions must be accompanied by the appropriate control conditions for the behavior (Ajzen, 
1991). This does not mean that behavioral intention and perceived behavioral control are the only factors 
that contribute to behavior. In a meta-analysis of prior research, Sutton (1998) indicates that the theory of 
reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior explain 19 to 38 percent of the variance in behavior. 
However, without the intention or ability to engage in an activity, one cannot perform the behavior. 
Researchers have used behavioral intentions as an antecedent to behavior in technology adoption (Davis, 
1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003) and online transaction behavior (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). As the integrated 
theoretical model illustrates, for an e-commerce transaction, the behavior is dependent on the formation of 
both willingness to buy (Jarvenpaa et al., 2000) and intent to provide sensitive information online. If the 
intended recipient variable path has been satisfied to form the wiliness to buy, then we can focus on the 
network environment. Therefore, we propose: 
P6:  Intent to provide sensitive information online is positively associated with the internet 
transaction. 
3.6 Outcome 
The outcomes of prior transactions inform future evaluations through enactive mastery (Bandura, 1982). 
Researchers have shown outcomes of prior risky decisions to affect the factors of perceived 
trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). Experiences with sending 
sensitive information from different network environments would shape a user’s understanding of the 
network environment characteristics’ ability to protect information. These positive and negative 
experiences of operating in network environments build general information security awareness. If 
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negative consequences occurred because of a prior transaction(s), then it is logical to assume that one 
would become more cognizant of security vulnerabilities associated with that network environment. 
Therefore, we propose: 
P7: Transaction results are positively associated with general information security awareness. 
Note that experiences only contribute to a general cognizance of security and do not impact the deeper 
understanding of information security. We can illustrate the differences in understanding by comparing 
awareness knowledge and how-to knowledge. Awareness knowledge is the general cognizance of 
technology, while how-to knowledge is understanding how to execute computing activities (Rogers, 1995). 
When a negative experience occurs, users gain awareness knowledge of the situational dangers. If they 
perform a root cause analysis, then users will understand how the data breach occurred and will advance 
their how-to knowledge. Additionally, non-negative experiences may result in an over-confidence in a 
technology’s ability to protect information. For example, users may continuously send sensitive 
information using unsecure networks, and, because they did not experience a data breach, they may 
perceive environments as more secure than the actual security posture.  
4 Contributions, Implications, and Future Research 
4.1 Theoretical Application 
People’s traveling on business and staying at a hotel is a common phenomenon, and one can apply our 
theoretical model to investigate their online behavior. While Internet access is the most important amenity 
in mid-priced business hotels (Moskowitz & Krieger, 2003), it is not the hotel’s core competency. Once the 
basic Internet requirement is met, other factors such as cleanliness, restaurants, staff, beds, pools, price, 
and proximity to airports, downtown, and shopping are important when travelers select hotels (Stringam & 
Gerdes, 2012). An example of applying the theory to this phenomenon is a business traveler, John, who 
selects his favorite hotel with Wi-Fi because it was close to the airport and fits the company’s budget. 
While at the hotel, he needs to email a sensitive file. He has a moderate general information security 
awareness, and he knows that hackers could steal information. He logs onto the hotel’s Wi-Fi network 
with his room number, so he assumes that he can trust the network. After all, he always stays at this hotel 
chain that is providing the LAN, and he trusts the chain so he trusts the network. His general information 
security awareness makes him understand that there are risks, but his network trust, strengthened by his 
LAN provider trust, reduces his perceived risk. He forms an intent to provide sensitive information online 
and engages in an Internet transaction. The most likely transaction result is that the file sends successfully 
and is not intercepted. However, the majority of hotel guest networks lack adequate security protections 
(Ogle, Wagner, & Talbert, 2008), and he could have been victim of a man-in-the-middle attack. The data 
breach would have a negative impact on his opinion of the hotel (Berezina, Cobanoglu, Miller, & Kwansa, 
2012) and would inform his general information security awareness for future online activities. 
4.2 Theoretical Contributions 
IS research has often nominalized the IT artifact into the background of the literature. We propose that our 
model highlights antecedents for online behaviors that occur in parallel to prior research’s focus on 
characteristics of the intended information recipient. Our research has the potential to provide insight on 
users’ trust of multiple network environments, their evaluation of information privacy based on varying 
types of information, and their perception and acceptance of risk to information while engaging in Internet 
activities. Researchers can apply this parallel track to numerous online activities including e-commerce, e-
government, electronic medical records, virtual teams, or any other activity that requires sending sensitive 
information. Examining network trust in these contexts could provide knowledge on the impact of the IT 
artifact on a wide range of phenomenon. Furthermore, by framing our theoretical model in a decision 
process, one can extend the model by further decomposing behavioral drivers in each phase of the 
decision process.  
4.3 Practical Implications 
The boundaries of network environments are blurring. Users now operate in multiple environments with 
varying degrees of protective technologies. While network technology continues to proliferate, IS research 
has often been criticized as having nominalized the IT artifact into the background of the literature 
(Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001), which may hurt the practical relevance of IS research because practitioners 
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are not provided with actionable information. We suggest that the network environment is an explicit actor 
during online transactions.  
We provide a long-overdue acknowledgement that infrastructure matters and transaction behavior 
involves more than just assessing risk/trust in the human points of contact, which potentially redefines 
how we perceive the consumer transaction process. Furthermore, by framing our theoretical model in the 
context of a transactional decision process, others can extend the model by further decomposing 
behavioral drivers in each phase of the decision process. These decisions are required for the conscious 
and active use of individual controlled protective technologies to protect information assets (Dinev & Hu, 
2007). If a user’s device becomes compromised on one network, then the infected device poses a threat 
to all accessible networks and, therefore, is a threat to the assets which security policies are designed to 
protect. Understanding the drivers behind users’ behavior while on networks outside of an organization’s 
control can provide a foundation for improving public information security education training and 
awareness (SETA) programs.  
In addition, organizations controlling the network environments could offer additional protections for 
consumers to reduce the environment’s perceived risk. Using Wi-Fi security protocols at public locations 
could provide the user with additional safeguards from the vulnerabilities we describe earlier. Combining 
these countermeasures with additional controls between the endpoints, such as virtual private networking, 
secure socket layer, or transmission layer security, would further reduce the risk to the loss of sensitive 
information in transit. If patrons of retail stores that provide public Wi-Fi are aware that the store uses 
additional security measures, then patrons could exhibit more network trust. This trust may extend to the 
retailer by showing patrons the ability, benevolence, and integrity to protect them from harm.  
4.4 Potential Limitations and Future Research 
The antecedents to behavior can be far reaching beyond the constructs we present. We understand there 
are many dimensions of complex constructs, but we chose to focus on measuring the core concepts of 
trust and risk to ensure our research’s maximum theoretical effectiveness. Throughout this manuscript, we 
identify potential variables that one could add to the model such as individual facilitating conditions 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003) and discuss expansion to include the ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et 
al., 1995) towards the IT artifact provider. Additional situational factors may influence the trust and risk 
decision and should be controlled for when empirically testing the proposed relationships. One could also 
examine other trust phenomenon, such as trust’s transferability from a primary trustor/trustee relationship 
to a secondary trustor/trustee relationship. For example, one may trust a retailer to refrain from engaging 
in opportunistic behavior when a trustor is purchasing an item; however, does this trust transfer to the 
retailer’s public Wi-Fi network?  
Demographic factors could also provide additional insight to user behavior in multiple network 
environments. Jones and Fox (2009), in a study for the PEW Institute, found that older generations are 
significantly more likely to seek health information online than younger generations. Older users’ desire to 
seek out online health information could relate to the linkage between health status and the use of online 
health information (Lueg, Moore, & Warkentin, 2003) because health problems tend to increase with age. 
Generational differences also exist for online banking activities. Generation X users are significantly more 
likely to conduct online banking than any other generation (Jones & Fox, 2009). Future research could 
attempt to determine if demographic characteristics are a determinant of the constructs we identify in this 
manuscript.  
Outside of our focus on individual security behavior, organizational facilitating conditions exist that could 
influence behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Some organizations block certain types of Internet traffic that 
prevents personal Internet transmissions from occurring. Future research could investigate the influence 
of information security policies on behavior while connected to the organization’s network versus an 
alternative network environment. Another avenue could examine if job performance expectations 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003) overshadow perceived risk due to the intrinsic or extrinsic rewards of the work 
(Davis et al., 1989). Furthermore, the effectiveness of information security policies and information 
security policy awareness (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) could provide valuable insights into educating users on 
the appropriate environments to transmit sensitive information.  
Advancing this research poses challenges that researchers must recognize. Researchers must take care 
when operationalizing and measuring proposed constructs because contextual factors may significantly 
impact the findings. General information security awareness is cognizance of the threats and 
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countermeasures used to protect information. This knowledge is processed and used during memory-
based judgments where the individual uses experiences to inform current actions (Campbell, 2001). Using 
knowledge in a memory-based judgment requires cognitive engagement and may not have as a great of 
an impact on decisions compared to what is on the top of the individual’s mind (Unnava, Burnkrant, & 
Erevelles, 1994). If the individual is thinking about the urgency of the online transaction, then the situation 
may impact individual’s risk tolerance and they may act in an unsafe manner despite knowing the 
dangers. 
Performing a case study would provide qualitative evidence of the propositions. For example, a case 
study of an organization in a partner network in which each partner organization formed dependencies on 
the data and information exchange between them would reveal insight toward the propositions. How the 
level of trust in the parent and partner organization impacts perceive risk could provide insights on how 
these relationships form and strengthen. An assessment through deep inspection of the entire partner 
network and its users and administrators could reveal that organizations may not trust the technology but 
trust outsourced service providers to implement secure solutions. Recent incidents involving Target and 
Sony provide interesting scenarios in which there are sensitive data transfers across retailer, financial 
agencies, and supplier networks.  
5 Conclusion 
Previous Internet behavioral research has nominalized the IT artifact and concentrated on understanding 
the relationship between the user and the intended information recipient. We posit that ubiquitous 
networking has increased the attack vectors for information in transit, and, therefore, that the network 
environment must be accounted for when researching Internet behaviors. Leveraging extant literature, we 
propose a theoretical model that suggests a user with high general information security awareness will 
demonstrate a lower level of network trust and a higher perceived risk while operating in network 
environments known to be vulnerable to the exploits previously described. Network trust is determined by 
the degree to which users feel the network environment can protect their information from harm and forms 
perceived risk. LAN provider trust moderates this risk even though providing Internet services may not be 
the provider’s core competency. When the residual risk to information is low, then one forms a positive 
intent to provide sensitive information online. This intention drives the internet transaction behavior, which 
results in outcomes that influence general information security awareness for future decisions. 
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